论文信息 - On Symmetric Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Distributions in a Finite-Action, Atomless Game

On Symmetric Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Distributions in a Finite-Action, Atomless Game

We show that in a finite action, atomless game, every Cournot-Nash equilibrium distribution can “besymmetrized.” This yields an elementary proof of a result of Mas-Colell.

M. Ali Khan | Yeneng Sun

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