Fostering cooperation in power asymmetrical water systems by the use of direct release rules and index-based insurance schemes

Abstract In river basin systems, power asymmetry is often responsible of inefficient and unbalanced water allocations. Climate change and anthropogenic pressure will possibly exacerbate such disparities as the dominant party controls an increasingly limited shared resource. In this context, the deployment of cooperation mechanisms giving greater consideration to a balanced distribution of the benefits, while improving system-wide efficiency, may be desirable. This often implies the intervention of a third party (e.g., the river basin water authority) imposing normative constraints (e.g., a minimum release) on the party in the dominant position. However, this imposition will be more acceptable to the dominant party if coupled with some form of compensation. For a public agency, compensation may be burdensome, especially when the allowance is triggered by natural events whose timing and magnitude are highly uncertain. In this context, index-based insurance contracts may represent a viable alternative and reduce the cost of achieving socially desirable outcomes. In this paper, we develop a hybrid cooperation mechanism composed of i) a direct normative constraint imposed by a regulator, and ii) an indirect financial tool, an index-based insurance contract, to be used as a compensation measure. The approach is developed for the Lake Como multi-purpose water system, Italy: a complex Alpine river basin, supporting several hydropower reservoirs and finally flowing into a regulated lake which supplies water to several downstream uses, mostly irrigated agriculture. The system is characterized by a manifest geographic power asymmetry: the upstream hydropower companies are free to release their stored water in time irrespective of the timing of the downstream demands. This situation can lead to financial losses by the downstream users and undesirable social outcomes. Results suggest that financial instruments may offer a reliable and relatively inexpensive alternative to other forms of compensation, and thereby favor more balanced management of multi-purpose water systems characterized by power asymmetry. This finding is especially relevant in times when granting of licenses to use/withdrawal water are often being reviewed with attention to environmental protection and equity issues.