Imperial Defence or Diversionary Attack? Anglo-French Strategic Planning in the Near East, 1936–40

From the escalation of the Abyssinian crisis in 1935 until the authorities in French-controlled Syria and Lebanon declared their loyalty to the Vichy government in July 1940, the eastern Mediterranean and its Near East margins were a focal point of Anglo-French defence co-operation. From Egypt in the south through the western arc of the Middle East to Turkey and Greece in the north, British and French imperial and strategic interests were entwined. The western powers confronted similar problems across the region. The signature of an Anglo-Egyptian treaty of alliance on 26 August 1936 was echoed some weeks later by the long-delayed conclusion of French draft treaties promising full selfgovernment in their Levant mandates. In both cases, faltering implementation of treaty pledges caused bitter dispute. The outbreak of the Arab revolt in Palestine fed nationalist dissent in Syria, and the neighbouring British and French mandatory administrations were hard-pressed to maintain imperial control between 1936 and 1939. Yet, by 1939, the presence of substantial British and French military forces in Egypt, Palestine and the Levant territories — albeit substantially devoted to imperial policing during the preceding three years — presented an opportunity for limited operations against the Axis powers mounted from the Middle East.

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