暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Jeffrey C. Ely,et al. Sequential Information Design , 2020, Econometrica.
[2] Emir Kamenica,et al. Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design , 2019, Annual Review of Economics.
[3] Stefano Ermon,et al. Generative Adversarial Imitation Learning , 2016, NIPS.
[4] S. Zamir,et al. Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information , 1985 .
[5] Shai Halevi,et al. A Cryptographic Solution to a Game Theoretic Problem , 2000, CRYPTO.
[6] D. Bergemann,et al. Information Design: A Unified Perspective , 2017, Journal of Economic Literature.
[7] Matan Tsur,et al. Information design in competitive insurance markets , 2020, J. Econ. Theory.
[8] I. Segal,et al. Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach , 2014 .
[9] Emir Kamenica,et al. Bayesian Persuasion , 2009 .
[10] Jerzy A. Filar,et al. Competitive Markov Decision Processes - Theory, Algorithms, and Applications , 1997 .
[11] Sean R Eddy,et al. What is dynamic programming? , 2004, Nature Biotechnology.
[12] Roger B. Myerson,et al. Optimal Auction Design , 1981, Math. Oper. Res..
[13] Michael H. Bowling,et al. Apprenticeship learning using linear programming , 2008, ICML '08.
[14] Itay Goldstein,et al. Stress Tests and Information Disclosure , 2017, J. Econ. Theory.
[15] Anca D. Dragan,et al. Inverse Reward Design , 2017, NIPS.
[16] M. Szydlowski. Optimal Financing and Disclosure , 2016, Manag. Sci..
[17] Stephen Morris,et al. Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games , 2015 .
[18] Penélope Hernández,et al. How Bayesian Persuasion Can Help Reduce Illegal Parking and Other Socially Undesirable Behavior , 2022, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
[19] Miltiadis Makris,et al. Information design in multistage games , 2018, Theoretical Economics.
[20] Quanyan Zhu,et al. On Incentive Compatibility in Dynamic Mechanism Design With Exit Option in a Markovian Environment , 2019, Dyn. Games Appl..
[21] Yakov Babichenko,et al. Private Bayesian Persuasion , 2019, J. Econ. Theory.
[22] Jeffrey C. Ely,et al. Suspense and Surprise , 2015, Journal of Political Economy.
[23] Nuttapong Chentanez,et al. Intrinsically Motivated Reinforcement Learning , 2004, NIPS.
[24] J. Harsanyi. Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points , 1968 .
[25] Tristan Tomala,et al. Interactive Information Design , 2018, Math. Oper. Res..
[26] K. Sonin,et al. Government Control of the Media , 2014 .
[27] Sanmay Das,et al. Reducing congestion through information design , 2017, 2017 55th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton).
[28] Laurent Mathevet,et al. On Information Design in Games , 2020, Journal of Political Economy.
[29] Richard Baskerville,et al. Information design , 2011, Eur. J. Inf. Syst..
[30] M. Utku Ünver,et al. Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources , 2009 .
[31] Alberto Marchesi,et al. Online Bayesian Persuasion , 2020, NeurIPS.
[32] A. Pavan,et al. Persuasion in Global Games with Application to Stress Testing ⇤ , 2017 .
[33] Sujit Gujar,et al. An optimal bidimensional multi-armed bandit auction for multi-unit procurement , 2018, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence.
[34] Achyuthan Unni Krishnan,et al. Reward Engineering for Object Pick and Place Training , 2020, ArXiv.
[35] D. Duffie,et al. Benchmarks in Search Markets , 2014 .
[36] Isabelle Brocas,et al. Influence through ignorance , 2007 .
[37] Paul Milgrom,et al. Putting Auction Theory to Work , 2004 .
[38] Optimal Two-Sided Market Mechanism Design for Large-Scale Data Sharing and Trading in Massive IoT Networks , 2019, ArXiv.
[39] Daniel Dewey,et al. Reinforcement Learning and the Reward Engineering Principle , 2014, AAAI Spring Symposia.
[40] Juan Pablo Xandri,et al. Robust Conditional Predictions in Dynamic Games: An Application to Sovereign Debt , 2014 .
[41] Stephen P. Boyd,et al. Convex Optimization , 2004, Algorithms and Theory of Computation Handbook.
[42] S. Morris,et al. The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information , 1997 .
[43] John C. Harsanyi,et al. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III: Part I. The Basic Model& , 2004, Manag. Sci..
[44] Martin L. Puterman,et al. Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming , 1994 .
[45] Haifeng Xu,et al. Information Disclosure as a Means to Security , 2015, AAMAS.
[46] Anind K. Dey,et al. Maximum Causal Entropy Correlated Equilibria for Markov Games , 2011, Interactive Decision Theory and Game Theory.
[47] W. Fleming. Book Review: Discrete-time Markov control processes: Basic optimality criteria , 1997 .
[48] D. Bergemann,et al. Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games , 2013 .
[49] Quanyan Zhu,et al. On the Differential Private Data Market: Endogenous Evolution, Dynamic Pricing, and Incentive Compatibility , 2021, ArXiv.
[50] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,et al. An Introduction to Game Theory , 2014 .
[51] A. Dickinson. Actions and habits: the development of behavioural autonomy , 1985 .