Compromising Electromagnetic Emanations of Wired USB Keyboards

The TEMPEST methods and procedures focus on classified information carriers generated by any electronic devices through electromagnetic radiation. Any electromagnetic radiation-carrying information is called compromising emanation. In this paper we will exemplify the keystroke information recovery by receiving compromising emanations emitted by the USB keyboards and the possibility of automatic detection of compromising emanation by using the autocorrelation function as well as the risk assessment of information vulnerability.

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