Newcomb's Paradox Revisited

This paper attempts to provide a solution to the Newcomb Problem, which was first presented in Nozick [1969]. The author suggested there a solution of his own, with which he admitted to being dissatisfied, and invited further comments that might 'enable [Nozick] to stop returning periodically to [the paradox]' (op. cit. p. 143). We found the paradox every bit as intriguing as Nozick did, and hope that our solution can restore his peace of mind. Suppose you are playing a game with a Being whom you believe to possess extraordinary predictive powers. The game proceeds as follows: Before you are two boxes. In one you can plainly see $I,ooo. The other is covered, so you cannot see what it contains. But you know that the Being has put into it either a million dollars or nothing, depending on what he had predicted that you will do come your turn to play. You have a choice between two actions: taking what is in both boxes, or taking what is in the covered box only. You know, however, that the Being played his move as follows: if he predicted that you will take both boxes, he has left the covered box empty; if he predicted that you will take the covered box only, he has put a million dollars in it. You are not allowed to use a chance device to determine your choice. You have enormous confidence in the Being's ability to predict your actions, and you know that he has correctly predicted