Can Katanga's mining sector drive growth and development in the DRC?

Abstract A common question asked across the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and by international observers is whether Katanga's mining sector can contribute to growth and development in the country. This paper answers this question through the analysis of two indicators: the fiscal contribution and the development of economic linkages. Mining can contribute to growth and development in the medium to long term, but for the moment the fiscal contribution and the establishment of local supply chains and processing industries remain underdeveloped. The status quo can be linked to the logic of the perpetuation of the weakness of the Congolese state as a rents generator for vested interests. This negatively affects the good governance of fiscal revenues and also translates into political risk exposure for mining companies. The latter inhibits mining companies' and industry collective action platforms' ability to contribute more directly to growth and development by, for example, “de-risking” the market entry of supplier and processing industries. Successful strategies to increase the growth and development footprint of mining need to go beyond technical interventions. Built on a political economy and economic impact analysis they need to interlink with and support a political reform process that can help build a significantly broad political constituency around the ideas of sustainable growth and development in the DRC.

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