In this work, we propose and investigate the idea of enhancing a System-on-Chip (SoC) communication architecture (the fabric that integrates system components and carries the communication traffic between them) to facilitate higher security. We observe that a wide range of common security attacks are manifested as abnormalities in the system-level communication traffic. Therefore, the communication architecture, with its global system-level visibility, can be used to detect them. The communication architecture can also effectively react to security attacks by disallowing the offending communication transactions, or by notifying appropriate components of a security violation. We describe the general principles involved in a security-enhanced communication architecture (SECA) and show how several security objectives can be encoded in terms of policies that govern the inter-component communication traffic. We detail the implementation of SECA in the context of a popular commercial on-chip bus architecture (the AMBA architecture from ARM) through a combination of a centralized security enforcement module, and enhancements to the bus interfaces of system components. We illustrate how SECA can be used to enhance embedded system security in several application scenarios. A simple instance of SECA has been implemented in a commercial application processor SoC for mobile phones. We provide results of experiments performed to validate the proposed concepts through system-level simulation, and evaluate their overheads through hardware implementation using a commercial design flow.
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