论文信息 - Cheap-Talk and Cooperation in a Society

Cheap-Talk and Cooperation in a Society

Does cheap-talk matter? Does costless communication necessarily yield Pareto optimal outcomes? When is it that the voices of those with disabilities reach the majority, or persons without disability? These questions are relevant in the context of economy and disability. In many situations, persons without disability do not see the barriers that persons with disability are faced with. If the barriers were removed simply by pointing them out, life would be easier for persons with disability than now.

Akihiko Matsui | A. Matsui

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