Coalitional skill games

We consider Coalitional Skill Games (CSGs), a simple model of cooperation among agents. This is a restricted form of coalitional games, where each agent has a set of skills that are required to complete various tasks. Each task requires a set of skills in order to be completed, and a coalition can accomplish the task only if the coalition's agents cover the set of required skills for the task. The gain for a coalition depends only on the subset of tasks it can complete. We consider the computational complexity of several problems in CSGs, for example, testing if an agent is a dummy or veto agent, computing the core of the game or testing whether the core is empty, and finding the Shapley value or Banzhaf power index of agents.

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