Game Theoretic Approach for Cost-Benefit Analysis of Malware Proliferation Prevention

Many existing research efforts in the field of malware proliferation aim at modelling and analysing its spread dynamics. Many malware dissemination models are based on the characteristics of biological disease spread in human populations. In this work, we utilise game theory in order to extend two very commonly used malware spread models (SIS and SIR) by incorporating defence strategies against malware proliferation. We consider three different security mechanisms, “patch”, “removal” and “patch and removal” on which our model is based. We also propose a cost-benefit model that describes optimal strategies the defender could follow when cost is taken into account. Lastly, as a way of illustration, we apply our models on the well studied Code-Red worm.

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