论文信息 - The Family of C-Bisection Auctions: Efficiency and Running Time

The Family of C-Bisection Auctions: Efficiency and Running Time

In this paper we analyze the performance of a recently proposed sequential auction, called the c-bisection auction, that can be used for a sale of a single indivisible object. We discuss the running time and the efficiency in the ex-post equilibrium of the auction. We show that by changing the parameter c of the auction we can trade off efficiency against running time. Moreover, we show that the auction that gives the desired level of efficiency in expectation takes the same number of rounds for any number of players.

Dries Vermeulen | Elena Grigorieva | P. Jean-Jacques Herings | Rudolf Muller

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