Distributed Knowledge and Indeterminate Meaning: The Case of the Columbia Shuttle Flight

We explore the processes that unfolded during NASA's ill-fated Columbia shuttle flight, as members of the mission team struggled to understand the significance of an unexpected foam-shedding event. It was difficult to categorize this event in real time, as two different criteria — a concern for safety and a concern for meeting schedules — were being used. Using in-depth data gathered on the Columbia shuttle flight, we describe the sensemaking processes that unfolded and discuss the implications for organizations.

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