Ideals of the Good Life: A Longitudinal/Cross-Sectional Study of Evaluative Reasoning in Children and Adults

This four-year, longitudinal/cross-sectional study investigates the plausibility of a structural model of evaluative reasoning about ideals of the good life and justice reasoning with subjects ranging in age from 5 to 72. The construct of evaluative reasoning, which includes both moral and non-moral components, is specified both psychologically and philosophically and distinguished from other developmental constructs such as justice reasoning. It is claimed that the model is normative. Support is found for this claim in an analysis of five schools of thought from traditional ethical theory that results in a minimal conception of the good life upon which the differing ethical theories might agree. A scoring manual for evaluative reasoning in the domains of good life, good work, good friendship, and the good person is presented with high reliability and internal validity. It is shown that, with the findings to date, the stage sequence constructed meets the general Piagetian criteria for a structural stage model. It is also shown that much of the meaningful content of evaluative reasoning can be classified according to categories derived from traditional ethics and metaethics. Particular analyses are focused on adult structural development. It is shown that a significant percentage of individuals over 20 years old continue their development in both evaluative and justice reasoning and that the post-conventional stages that are postulated in both models are restricted to members of this age group. It is also shown that advanced education beyond the baccalaureate level is a significant factor in the development of post-conventional reasoning. It has been a central tenet of structural-developmental psychology to focus on the consistent and universal, rather than the anomalous and unique aspects of human development (Piaget, 1968; Kohlberg, 1969, 1981). With this guiding principle, research has consisted of investigations of those human activities that share a universal function, for example, logical thinking (Piaget, 1954) and certain forms of moral, social, and epistemological reasoning (Kohlberg, 1981; Selman, 1980; Broughton, 1978). Following this paradigm, it is the purpose of this study to show that aspects of both moral and non-moral evaluative reasoning, conceived of here under the general construct "ideals of the good life," also conform to a universal human function and, as such, are appropriate for structural-developmental investigation and analysis. Drawing from both developmental psychology and ethical philosophy, this work defines a structural, hierarchical model of evaluative reasoning about the good life. Its general conclusions are that, although such reasoning varies across persons, it does not vary randomly. On the contrary, evidence will be presented here to show that value reasoning has underlying structural components that fall into a sequential pattern of developmental stages, the highest of which, it will be claimed, meets philosophical criteria of adequacy. Thus, parallel to Kohlberg's (1981; 1973a) model of justice reasoning, the normative aspect of this constructed model of evaluative reasoning about the good life relies on a philosophically justified articulation of the highest stage. In addition to categorizing structures into developmental stages, it will be shown that the content of ethical reasoning can be categorized in a meaningful way, that is supported both empirically and theoretically. These categories represent "philosophical orientations," defined not in terms of the underlying structure of value reasoning, but in terms of the actual ultimate values that cohere an individual's philosophy of the good life. Thus, in conjunction with a theory of structural development, a content analysis model will also be presented. The term "ideals of the good life" may bring to mind many different concepts. It represents the general construct of the present study and is constructed from both traditional ethics and structuraldevelopmental psychology. The operational definition of the good life that will be used in this study is, first, the combined set of human ideals that persons affirm in normative evaluative judgments about the good life, in general, and about good work, good friendship or relationship, and the good person, in particular. Second, it is the sets of reasons individuals give in support of these judgments. Thus, operationally, ideals of the good life consist of two major components. The first is a description of what traits of character, objects, actions, or experiences are truly good. The second concerns the justification of this description. It is these ideals that are structurally represented in the sequential stage model. The psychological approach to ethics has been to describe the phenomena and/or the development of human valuing. This approach interprets observable behavior and reasoning involved in the processes and consequences of ethical reasoning. The aim is to explain, rather than to prescribe, the development and expression of values or moral principles. In the present work, psychology is coupled with philosophy to form a philosophically supported psychological theory. There are two main reasons for the necessity of philosophy in a study of evaluative reasoning about the good life. The first and most obvious reason is that ideas concerning value or the good are ethical in nature. To say something is good is to make an ethical claim and ethics is a philosophical domain. In this study, ethical theory provides not only a systematic analysis of morality and value, but also a philosophical conception of the person and of "the good life." For example, the present conception of stages of evaluative reasoning is dependent on a philosophical conception of the person as a rational human being capable of making and acting upon autonomous life choices (Rawls, 1971). In accordance with Rawls, it is assumed that, to one degree or another, persons formulate rational life plans that are organized by their conceptions of the good. These conceptions are comprised of ideals and virtues, the fulfillment of which leads to happiness. In order for one to have a rational life plan based on the good, the organization of the plan must form a structure that is generally consistent across domains of experience; that is, each individual must construct a consistent philosophy of what is good. Generally, the structure of the good is viewed as an organization of values and ideals that provide individuals with both motivation and meaningfulness in life. Specifically, the structure of the good provides a consistent set of criteria that the individual uses in making evaluative decisions and judgments. It is this very philosophical conception that guides the present study of ideals of the good life and that has a significant impact on both its psychological theory and its methodology. The second reason for the necessity of philosophy is that the present developmental model is a normative one; that is, it is claimed that the highest stage is most adequate. Such a claim requires a philosophical as well as a psychological conception of adequacy. Although the fundamental scheme of this study is psychological and, thus, primarily descriptive, part of any developmental analysis includes an explanation of where development leads. Typically, such psychological analyses blur the boundaries between descriptive and prescriptive work.