Two-Party Fine-Grained Assured Deletion of Outsourced Data in Cloud Systems

With clients losing direct control of their data, this paper investigates an important problem of cloud systems: When clients delete data, how can they be sure that the deleted data will never resurface in the future if the clients do not perform the actual data removal themselves? How to guarantee inaccessibility of deleted data when the data is not in their possession? Using a novel key modulation function, we design a solution for two-party fine-grained assured deletion. The solution does not rely on any third-party server. Each client only keeps one or a small number of keys, regardless of how big its file system is. The client is able to delete any individual data item in any file without causing significant overhead, and the deletion is permanent - no one can recover already-deleted data, not even after gaining control of both the client device and the cloud server. We validate our design through experimental evaluation.

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