On the Economics of Law and Order

Professor Becker has recently demonstrated the usefulness of "conventional " economic analysis in coming to grips with what is usually considered to be a noneconomic problem-crime and punishment (Becker 1968). In the article, he derives criteria for optimal levels of expenditure on law enforcement and form of punishment subject to a given legal framework. The point of this paper is that the legal framework need not be taken as constant but is itself subject to policy choice. Therefore, I propose to extend the Becker framework to take account of this additional area of social choice and compare the implications of this model with the original, less complete version. Among countries and over time, one can find enormous variations in "rules of the game" pertaining to standards of evidence, presumption of guilt, rights to counsel, and procedures for arrest and indictment. Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court upholding rights of accused persons and restricting the freedom of police to obtain evidence in certain ways have become a major political issue of late. Indeed, the Becker model as formulated would seem to agree with some proponents of "law and order" who argue that it is undesirable to tie the hands of the police with legal niceties. After all, it is quite clear that the costs of apprehending and convicting a given percentage of offenders will be lower without these conventions than it would be with them. Note that in certain conditions, such as a state of martial law, many legal safeguards are relaxed, presumably to apprehend a maximum proportion of offenders with minimum cost. Despite Geneva Conventions, it has not been unknown for occupying armies to punish entire communities when certain offenses