Advertising fee in business-format franchising

Most franchisors charge an advertising fee in addition to the better known royalty and franchise fee. We study the role of the advertising fee in improving channel coordination. We begin our analysis with a simple case of one franchisor dealing with two identical franchisees and find that the advertising fee allows the franchisor to commit to a specific level of advertising spending at the time of contract acceptance. We also find that the lump-sum advertising fee is better than the sales-based advertising fee. These results are intriguing because most franchisors use the sales-based advertising fee. We show that when franchisees' markets differ in how advertising affects sales, the franchisor may prefer the sales-based advertising fee. There are two reasons for the higher profitability of the sales-based advertising fee. First, the sales-based advertising fee conditions the franchisor's advertising decision on the franchisees' price and service decisions, and induces them to make better price and service decisions. The second reason is that with heterogeneous franchisees, using the sales-based advertising fee does not increase the total sales-based component in the fee structure. These results also hold when the franchisor pledges to contribute a matching fraction of the advertising fee to the advertising fund.

[1]  Preyas S. Desai,et al.  Demand signalling under unobservable effort in franchising: linear and nonlinear price contracts , 1995 .

[2]  K. Moorthy,et al.  Comment---Managing Channel Profits: Comment , 1987 .

[3]  Richard Staelin,et al.  Rentals, Sales, and Buybacks: Managing Secondary Distribution Channels , 1994 .

[4]  J. Spengler Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy , 1950, Journal of Political Economy.

[5]  J. Tirole The Theory of Industrial Organization , 1988 .

[6]  Ralph A. Winter,et al.  The Economics of Franchise Contracts , 1985, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[7]  Joel S. Demski,et al.  Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents , 1984 .

[8]  Daniel R. Siegel,et al.  On the Observational Equivalence of Managerial Contracts Under Conditions of Moral Hazard and Self-Selection , 1988 .

[9]  Wujin Chu,et al.  Channel Coordination Mechanisms for Customer Satisfaction , 1995 .

[10]  Michael L. Katz,et al.  Vertical contractual relations , 1989 .

[11]  Bengt Holmstrom,et al.  Moral Hazard and Observability , 1979 .

[12]  B. Wernerfelt,et al.  On credible delegation by oligopolists: a discussion of distribution channel management , 1989 .

[13]  Stanley Baiman,et al.  AGENCY RESEARCH IN MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING: A SECOND LOOK. , 1990 .

[14]  Amiya K. Basu,et al.  Salesforce Compensation Plans: An Agency Theoretic Perspective , 1985 .

[15]  R. Lal Improving Channel Coordination Through Franchising , 1990 .

[16]  Rajiv Lal,et al.  Salesforce Compensation Plans in Environments with Asymmetric Information , 1986 .

[17]  E. Maskin,et al.  Monopoly with Incomplete Information , 1984 .

[18]  Preyas S. Desai,et al.  Aggregate versus product-specific pricing: Implications for franchise and traditional channels , 1996 .

[19]  Robert E. Bond,et al.  The source book of franchise opportunities , 1985 .