Is the Predicted ESS in the Sequential Assessment Game Evolvable?

The Sequential Assessment Game model of animal contests predicts an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) that is a sequence of thresholds for giving up. Simulated evolution experiments reveal that the selection pressure on higher-numbered thresholds is most likely too low to allow for the theoretically predicted ESS to evolve in nature.

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