A Process-Based Architecture for an Artificial Conscious Being

A conscious being is a system that experiences (feels) something. In order to build an artificial conscious being we need to give an account of what it is to experience or feel something. Any project that aims to design an artificial conscious being thus needs to be concerned with the notion of experience or feeling. As I argue in the following, for the purposes of robotics this task can be profitably approached if we leave behind the dualist framework of traditional Cartesian substance metaphysics and adopt a process-metaphysical stance. I begin by sketching the outline of a process-ontological scheme whose basic entities are called ‘onphenes’. From within this scheme I formulate a series of constraints on an architecture for consciousness. An architecture abiding by these constraints is capable of ontogenesis driven by onphenes. Since an onphene is a process in which the occurrence of an event creates the conditions for the occurrence of another event of the same kind, an onphene-based architecture allows for external events to provoke the repetition of other events of the same kind. In an artificial conscious being, this propensity to repeat events can be considered as a functional reconstruction of motivation. In sum, if we base the architecture for an artificial conscious being on onphenes, we receive a system that experiences (feels) and is capable of developing new motivations. In conclusion I present some experimental results in support of this claim.

[1]  Andrew Newman The Causal Relation and its Terms , 1988 .

[2]  Igor Aleksander,et al.  How to Build a Mind , 2000 .

[3]  Giorgio C. Buttazzo,et al.  Artificial Consciousness: Utopia or Real Possibility? , 2001, Computer.

[4]  Igor Aleksander,et al.  Impossible Minds: My Neurons, My Consciousness , 1996 .

[5]  Jerry A. Fodor,et al.  Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science , 1981 .

[6]  Henry P. Stapp Whiteheadian process and quantum theory of mind , 1998 .

[7]  Tatsuo Togawa,et al.  A model of cortical neural network structure , 1998, Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Conference of the IEEE Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society. Vol.20 Biomedical Engineering Towards the Year 2000 and Beyond (Cat. No.98CH36286).

[8]  Peter H. Salus,et al.  Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism , 1987 .

[9]  A. Whitehead Science and the Modern World , 1926 .

[10]  H. Maturana,et al.  Autopoiesis and Cognition , 1980 .

[11]  Riccardo Manzotti,et al.  Si può parlare di coscienza artificiale , 2002 .

[12]  Daniel M. Haybron The Causal and Explanatory Role of Information Stored in Connectionist Networks , 2004, Minds and Machines.

[13]  H. Maturana,et al.  The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding , 2007 .

[14]  N. Malcolm,et al.  Consciousness and causality: A debate on the nature of mind , 1984 .

[15]  H. Maturana,et al.  Autopoiesis and Cognition : The Realization of the Living (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Scie , 1980 .

[16]  A. Whitehead Adventures of ideas , 1933 .

[17]  J. Cramer,et al.  An overview of the transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics , 1988 .

[18]  A. White,et al.  The Causal Theory of Perception , 1961 .

[19]  Giulio Sandini,et al.  An anthropomorphic retina-like structure for scene analysis , 1980 .

[20]  Jerry A. Fodor A theory of content and other essays [electronic resource] , 1990 .

[21]  Alfred W. Kaszniak,et al.  Emotions, Qualia, and Consciousness , 2001 .

[22]  David J. Chalmers,et al.  The Components of Content , 1994 .

[23]  C. Koch,et al.  A framework for consciousness , 2003, Nature Neuroscience.

[24]  J. Fodor,et al.  A Theory of Content and Other Essays. , 1992 .

[25]  A. Clark,et al.  Trading spaces: Computation, representation, and the limits of uninformed learning , 1997, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[26]  Fred I. Dretske Naturalizing the Mind , 1995 .

[27]  I. N. Marshall,et al.  The Quantum Self , 1991 .

[28]  G. Sandini,et al.  EMOTIONS AND LEARNING IN A DEVELOPING ROBOT , 2001 .

[29]  Mark H. Bickhard,et al.  The emergence of contentful experience , 2001 .

[30]  Richard H. Schlagel Why not Artificial Consciousness or Thought? , 1999, Minds and Machines.

[31]  Anthony J. Marcel,et al.  Consciousness in Contemporary Science , 1992 .

[32]  Daniel M. Hausman,et al.  Causal Asymmetries: List of Figures , 1998 .

[33]  Gerard O'Brien,et al.  Cognitive science and phenomenal consciousness: A dilemma, and how to avoid it , 1997 .

[34]  G. Edelman,et al.  A Universe Of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination , 2000 .

[35]  Barry Loewer,et al.  Meaning in mind : Fodor and his critics , 1993 .

[36]  Giulio Sandini,et al.  A retina-like CMOS sensor and its applications , 2000, Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Sensor Array and Multichannel Signal Processing Workshop. SAM 2000 (Cat. No.00EX410).

[37]  Ronald C. Arkin,et al.  An Behavior-based Robotics , 1998 .

[38]  R A Brooks,et al.  New Approaches to Robotics , 1991, Science.

[39]  D. McFarland,et al.  Intelligent behavior in animals and robots , 1993 .

[40]  A. Vinter,et al.  The self-organizing consciousness. , 2002, The Behavioral and brain sciences.

[41]  Igor Aleksander,et al.  The self 'out there' , 2001, Nature.

[42]  S. Zeki,et al.  The disunity of consciousness , 2003, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

[43]  D. Chalmers Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings , 2021 .

[44]  D. Chalmers The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory , 1996 .

[45]  Vlatko Vedral,et al.  Foundations and Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics , 2001 .

[46]  D. Dennett Quining Qualia , 1993 .