Some Empirical Comments on the Theory of Relative Backwardness: The Russian Case

Gerschenkron's relative-backwardness hypothesis is perhaps the most widely accepted model of European industrialization and has served as a basis for analyzing the industrialization experience of a whole series of countries, including even the Soviet Union. To summarize Gerschenkron's model as briefly as possible (which is no easy accomplishment), I note the following essentials.' Latecomers to industrialization experience tension when confronted with the recognition of their relative economic backwardness. This relative backwardness may be revealed by the loss of a military campaign to a technologically superior foe or through other more pedestrian means. The greater the degree of relative backwardness as measured by per capita income, literacy, the communications network, and other indicators of industrial progress, the greater the ensuing tension, which builds up to be released ultimately in the form of an industrialization spurt. The relationship between the degree of relative backwardness and the magnitude of the spurt of industrial growth is positive, and the spurt will reveal itself as an upward discontinuity in the backward country's index of industrial production (not by a discontinuity in a more comprehensive index such as real GNP). What has caused this spurt in industrialization according to the