Notes on a Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions

The goodness of a collective decision often depends on the wishes of those affected by it. The candidate with a majority is assumed to be best under democracy. Reasonable proposals on how to finance and carry out a public project should pass the minimal test of efficiency. Satisfactory assignments of students to colleges should take into account the interests of those who are seeking education. All of the above are examples of situations in which knowing the preferences of agents is necessary to determine what is collectively best.

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