Theory, Data, and Hypothesis Testing: World Bank Environmental Reform Redux

We thank Tamar Gutner for her thoughtful comments on our article, “Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform” (International Organization, Spring 2003). While championing principal-agent (P-A) theory as the most promising approach to the study of international organizations (IOs) in general, she questions the novelty of our P-A model and criticizes both our methods and data. We are grateful for the opportunity to clarify our contributions and offer concrete solutions to the research questions that she raises.We thank Brad Parks and Sue Peterson for comments on an early version of this article. For research assistance, we are grateful to Daniel Magleby, Dan Maliniak, and Jess Sloan.

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