Repression, Micromobilization, and Political Protest

Several major theories - deprivation theory, resource mobilization theory, and the theory of collective action - make different predictions about the effects of repression on political protest. The results of empirical research have been inconclusive as well: some studies have found that repression deters protest, whereas others have found a positive (radicalizing) effect of repression on protest. This article proposes a model that explains the different effects of repression, in conjunction with other incentives, on political protest. Wefirst hypothesize that repression has a direct negative (deterring) effect on protest because repression is a cost. This direct effect may be endorsed under some conditions, or it may be neutralized, or even reversed if repression leads to micromobilization processes that raise incentives for protest. 77Tese processes are set in motion if persons are exposed to repression, if repression is considered illegitimate by these persons and their social environment (whzich holds in case of legal protest), and if these persons are members of groups that support protest. Under such conditions repression indirectly increases protest by launching micromnobilization processes. These processes and their effects are specified in a model which is tested and confinned by a panel study of opponents of nuclear power in West Germany. It is generally known that repressive acts of state officials (such as those associated with the police, courts, and governments) constraining political protest are important factors in shaping the rise and decline of social movements and individual participation in social movement activities. Also well documented by empirical studies is that the effects of repression vary: increasing repression may promote or impede mobilization processes. There has been little effort, however, to develop propositions that explain under what conditions repression advances or inhibits the growth of social movements and participation in protest actions. This article suggests such propositions that focus on individual participation in social movement activities and tests these proposi

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