Covert Channel Elimination Protocols

With the increasing growth of electronic communications, it is becoming important to provide a mechanism for enforcing various security policies on network communications. This paper discusses our implementation of several previously proposed protocols that enforce theell LaPadula security model. We also introduce a new protocol called "Quantized Pump" that offers several advantages, and present experimental results to support our claims.

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