Perceptual Stability Analysis of a Graph Model System

Perceptual graph model systems are designed to be employed when there are discrepancies in decision makers' (DMs) perceptions of a conflict, which may be caused, for instance, by the presence of negative emotion or asymmetric information among DMs. In this case, conventional stability analysis cannot be used; perceptual stability analysis is proposed as a new theoretical procedure that extends existing stability algorithms to situations when DMs have independent perceptions or awarenesses of a conflict. The overriding objective of perceptual stability analysis is to predict possible resolutions, and unveil the dependence of these predictions on variability in a DM's awareness. Perceptual stability analysis takes a two-phase approach. In Phase 1, individual stability analysis is applied to each DM's graph model (a perceptual graph model) from the point of view of the owner of the model, for each DM in the model, using standard or perceptual solution concepts, depending on the owner's awareness of others' perceptions. Then, in Phase 2, metastability analysis is employed to consolidate the stability assessments of a state in all perceptual graph models and across all variants of awareness-i.e., in all possible graph model systems. The distinctive modes of equilibria thus defined reflect the incompatibilities in DMs' perceptions and viewpoints, but nonetheless provide important insights into possible resolutions of the conflict. To demonstrate the practical application of these new developments, a model of the conflict in Chechnya is presented and analyzed.

[1]  J. Nash,et al.  NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES , 1951, Classics in Game Theory.

[2]  Keith W. Hipel,et al.  Perceptual Graph Model Systems , 2009 .

[3]  Keith W. Hipel,et al.  Conflict analysis: models and resolutions , 1984 .

[4]  Keith W. Hipel,et al.  Policy Equilibrium and Generalized Metarationalities for Multiple Decision-Maker Conflicts , 2007, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics - Part A: Systems and Humans.

[5]  R. Michael Alvarez,et al.  Uncertainty and Political Perceptions , 1994, The Journal of Politics.

[6]  Keith W. Hipel,et al.  A decision support system for interactive decision making - Part II: analysis and output interpretation , 2003, IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cybern. Part C.

[7]  Anatol Lieven,et al.  Russia's Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia , 2004 .

[8]  K. Hipel,et al.  The Role of Emotions in Envisioning Outcomes in Conflict Analysis , 2005 .

[9]  Keith W. Hipel,et al.  Perception and Emotion in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution , 2005, 2005 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics.

[10]  Asbjørn Eide Chechnya: In Search of Constructive Accommodation , 2001, Leiden Journal of International Law.

[11]  Keith W. Hipel,et al.  A decision support system for interactive decision making-Part I: model formulation , 2003, IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cybern. Part C.

[12]  H. Raiffa,et al.  Negotiation Analysis: The Science and Art of Collaborative Decision Making , 2003 .

[13]  Charles Leake Interactive Decision Making: The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution , 1993 .

[14]  Keith W. Hipel,et al.  TURBULENCE IN MIRAMICHI BAY: THE BURNT CHURCH CONFLICT OVER NATIVE FISHING RIGHTS1 , 2006 .

[15]  D. Lutz,et al.  Paradoxes of Rationality: Theory of Metagames and Political Behavior , 1973 .

[16]  J. Neumann,et al.  Theory of games and economic behavior , 1945, 100 Years of Math Milestones.

[17]  J. Nash Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games. , 1950, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

[18]  Tom Gilb,et al.  Interactive Decision Making: The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution , 1994 .

[19]  Luis G. Vargas Conflict analysis: Models and resolutions: Niall M. FRASER and Keith W. HIPEL Volume 11 in: North-Holland Series in System Science and Engineering, North-Holland, New York, 1984, xx + 377 pages, $34.50 , 1985 .

[20]  Dmitri Trenin The Chechen Wars. Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? Matthew Evangelista. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002. $19.95/£14.50 (pbk). 244 pp , 2003 .