Pooled Mining Makes Selfish Mining Tricky
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] John R. Douceur,et al. The Sybil Attack , 2002, IPTPS.
[2] Emin Gün Sirer,et al. Majority is not enough , 2013, Financial Cryptography.
[3] Maria Gradinariu Potop-Butucaru,et al. ZeroBlock: Timestamp-Free Prevention of Block-Withholding Attack in Bitcoin , 2016 .
[4] Alf Zugenmaier,et al. The Impact of Uncle Rewards on Selfish Mining in Ethereum , 2018, 2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW).
[5] Camilo Rocha,et al. Double-spend Attack Models with Time Advantange for Bitcoin , 2016, CLEI Selected Papers.
[6] Yongdae Kim,et al. Be Selfish and Avoid Dilemmas: Fork After Withholding (FAW) Attacks on Bitcoin , 2017, CCS.
[7] Ittay Eyal,et al. The Miner's Dilemma , 2014, 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
[8] Aviv Zohar,et al. Optimal Selfish Mining Strategies in Bitcoin , 2015, Financial Cryptography.
[9] Kartik Nayak,et al. Stubborn Mining: Generalizing Selfish Mining and Combining with an Eclipse Attack , 2016, 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P).
[10] Satoshi Nakamoto. Bitcoin : A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System , 2009 .
[11] Meni Rosenfeld,et al. Analysis of Bitcoin Pooled Mining Reward Systems , 2011, ArXiv.
[12] Aggelos Kiayias,et al. The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol: Analysis and Applications , 2015, EUROCRYPT.
[13] Elaine Shi,et al. FruitChains: A Fair Blockchain , 2017, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch..
[14] Bart Preneel,et al. Publish or Perish: A Backward-Compatible Defense Against Selfish Mining in Bitcoin , 2017, CT-RSA.
[15] Aviv Zohar,et al. Secure High-Rate Transaction Processing in Bitcoin , 2015, Financial Cryptography.