The testable implications of zero-sum games

We study collective choices from the revealed preference theory viewpoint. For every product set of individual actions, joint choices are called Nash-rationalizable if there exists a preference relation for each player such that the selected joint actions are Nash equilibria of the corresponding game. We characterize Nash-rationalizable joint choice behavior by zero-sum games, or games of conflicting interests. If the joint choice behavior forms a product subset, the behavior is called interchangeable. We prove that interchangeability is the only additional empirical condition which distinguishes zero-sum games from general non-cooperative games.

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