论文信息 - Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices

Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices

Summary. Auctions in which individuals can purchase more than one unit of the good being sold differ in striking ways from multi-unit auctions in which individuals may purchase only one unit. The uniform price auction in particular frequently yields Nash equilibria in which bidders underbid for their second unit and therefore pay very low prices for the good. This paper characterizes equilibria for the uniform price auction.

R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans | C. Kahn

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