ON THE CORRECT APPLICATION OF ANIMAL SIGNALLING THEORY TO HUMAN COMMUNICATION

The defining problem of animal signalling theory is how reliable communication systems remain stable. The problem comes into sharp focus when signals take an arbitrary form, as human words do. Many researchers, particularly those in evolutionary linguistics, assume that the handicap principle is the only recognised solution to this paradox, and hence conclude that the process that underpins reliability in humans must be exceptional. However, there are other examples of cheap yet reliable signals in nature, and corresponding processes that may explain such examples. This paper reviews these alternatives and concludes that by far the most likely explanation of the stability of human communication is our ability to assess individual reputation: we hold the threat of social exclusion against those who signal unreliably and hence keep their utterances reliable.

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