Computation of Characteristic Function Values for Linear-State Differential Games

This paper addresses the issue of computation of the characteristic function values in a n-player linear-state cooperative differential game. One shows that the characteristic functions coincide under two different definitions of the strategic strength of coalitions. An illustrative example drawn from environmental economics is provided.

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