Effects of repetition and foreknowledge in task-set reconfiguration.

To examine the roles of executive control and automatic activation in task switching, we manipulated foreknowledge as well as task transitions. In Experiments 1 and 2, performance with foreknowledge was faster than performance with no foreknowledge, but the amount of switch cost did not depend on foreknowledge. This result suggests that switch costs primarily reflect persisting activation rather than inadequate preparation. In Experiment 3, switch cost was greater with foreknowledge about task transition alone than with foreknowledge about both task transition and identity, suggesting that foreknowledge about specific task identity did allow preparation for a switched task. We argue that task repetition and foreknowledge effects are independent. Although foreknowledge allows preparation for both repeated and switched tasks, repeating the same task has benefits over task switching regardless of foreknowledge.

[1]  John R. Anderson,et al.  Rules of the Mind , 1993 .

[2]  I. Biederman,et al.  Mental set and mental shift revisited , 1976 .

[3]  F. Lhermitte.  'Utilization behaviour' and its relation to lesions of the frontal lobes. , 1983, Brain : a journal of neurology.

[4]  S. Los,et al.  On the origin of mixing costs: exploring information processing in pure and mixed blocks of trials , 1996 .

[5]  Walter Schneider,et al.  Controlled and Automatic Human Information Processing: 1. Detection, Search, and Attention. , 1977 .

[6]  Arthur F. Kramer,et al.  Strategies and automaticity. I: Basic findings and conceptual framework , 1994 .

[7]  S. Monsell,et al.  Costs of a predictible switch between simple cognitive tasks. , 1995 .

[8]  D E Kieras,et al.  A computational theory of executive cognitive processes and multiple-task performance: Part 1. Basic mechanisms. , 1997, Psychological review.

[9]  R. A. Carlson,et al.  Procedural frameworks for simple arithmetic skills , 1998 .

[10]  Donald A. Norman,et al.  Attention to Action , 1986 .

[11]  John R. Anderson.  The Architecture of Cognition , 1983 .

[12]  M. Posner,et al.  Attention and cognitive control. , 1975 .

[13]  R. Shiffrin,et al.  Controlled and automatic human information processing: I , 1977 .

[14]  J. H. Neely.  Semantic priming and retrieval from lexical memory: Roles of inhibitionless spreading activation and limited-capacity attention. , 1977 .

[15]  Alan S. Brown,et al.  Information Processing and Cognition: The Loyola Symposium , 1976 .

[16]  E Berendsen,et al.  Goal neglect and inhibitory limitations: dissociable causes of interference effects in conflict situations. , 1999, Acta psychologica.

[17]  D. Alan Allport,et al.  SHIFTING INTENTIONAL SET - EXPLORING THE DYNAMIC CONTROL OF TASKS , 1994 .

[18]  David H. Lundy,et al.  Consistency and restructuring in learning cognitive procedural sequences. , 1992 .

[19]  N. Meiran.  Reconfiguration of processing mode prior to task performance. , 1996 .

[20]  G. Logan.  Executive control of thought and action , 1985 .

[21]  T. Shallice,et al.  The origins of utilization behaviour. , 1989, Brain : a journal of neurology.

[22]  Tim Shallice,et al.  MULTIPLE LEVELS OF CONTROL PROCESSES , 1994 .

[23]  C D Frith,et al.  Brain activity during memory retrieval. The influence of imagery and semantic cueing. , 1996, Brain : a journal of neurology.

[24]  R De Jong,et al.  An intention-activation account of residual switch costs , 2000 .

[25]  C. Lebiere,et al.  The Atomic Components of Thought , 1998 .