Optimal Dynamic Auctions

We consider a dynamic auction problem motivated by the traditional single-leg, multi-period revenue management problem. A seller with C units to sell faces potential buyers with unit demand who arrive and depart over the course of T time periods. The time at which a buyer arrives, her value for a unit as well as the time by which she must make the purchase are private information. In this environment, we derive the revenue maximizing Bayesian incentive compatible selling mechanism.

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