论文信息 - Insider trading and risk aversion

Insider trading and risk aversion

Abstract This paper is a continuous time version of Holden and Subrahmanyam (Economics Letters 44 (1994) 181). The paper extends Kyle (Econometrica 53 (1985) 1315) by introducing risk aversion on the side of the monopolist informed trader and allows for the liquidity traders instantaneous demand to depend on cost of trading, as well as on the risk of the stock. The main result of the paper is that, in equilibrium, the price pressure decreases with time regardless of the elasticity of the liquidity demand function.

Shmuel Baruch

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