Competitive search markets for durable goods

Summary. This paper considers a dynamic version of Akerlof's (1970) lemons problem where buyers and sellers must engage in search to find a trading partner. We show that if goods are durable, the market itself may provide a natural sorting mechanism. In equilibrium, high-quality goods sell at a higher price than low-quality goods but also circulate longer. This accords with the common wisdom that sellers who want to sell fast may have to accept a lower price. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes under private information with those under complete information. Surprisingly, we find that for a large range of parameter values the quilibrium outcomes under the two information regimes coincide, despite the fact that circulation time is used to achieve separation.

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