An emergence solution to the reasoning dual processes interaction problem

In a desire to account for experimental evidence that is said to indicate that human reasoning is subject to errors and biases, some scholars have championed dual process theories of reasoning. These scholars have attempted to resolve the dual processes interaction problem by proposing either additional processes or one system dominating the other. Utilising modularity theory, this article asserts that human reasoning consists of a multitude of modules that interact via dynamical emergent processes based on information input and output requirements. The proposed solution combines research from modularity and emergence theories.

[1]  M. Osman An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning , 2004, Psychonomic bulletin & review.

[2]  Melanie Mitchell,et al.  Complexity - A Guided Tour , 2009 .

[3]  D. Kahneman A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality. , 2003, The American psychologist.

[4]  Axel Cleeremans,et al.  Implicit Learning and Consciousness: An Empirical, Philosophical and Computational Consensus in the Making , 2015 .

[5]  F. Gobet,et al.  The Cambridge handbook of expertise and expert performance , 2006 .

[6]  M. S. Franch The Robot??s Rebellion: Finding Meaning in the Age of Darwin , 2006 .

[7]  S. Frederick Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 19, Number 4—Fall 2005—Pages 25–42 Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making , 2022 .

[8]  Jonathan Evans How many dual-process theories do we need? One, two, or many? , 2009 .

[9]  J. Fodor The Mind Doesn't Work That Way : The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology , 2000 .

[10]  L. Cosmides,et al.  Mapping the mind: Origins of domain specificity: The evolution of functional organization , 1994 .

[11]  K. Cottingham Two are not always better than one. , 2009, Journal of proteome research.

[12]  John H. Miller,et al.  Complex adaptive systems - an introduction to computational models of social life , 2009, Princeton studies in complexity.

[13]  W ReynoldsCraig Flocks, herds and schools: A distributed behavioral model , 1987 .

[14]  Á. Eraña Dual process theories versus massive modularity hypotheses , 2012 .

[15]  F. Bartlett,et al.  Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology , 1932 .

[16]  Gerd Gigerenzer,et al.  The recognition heuristic: How ignorance makes us smart , 1999 .

[17]  Subjective Validity Judgments as an Index of Sensitivity to Sampling Bias , 2005 .

[18]  Matthew D. Lieberman,et al.  What zombies can't do: A social cognitive neuroscience approach to the irreducibility of reflective consciousness , 2012 .

[19]  Wim De Neys,et al.  Dual Processing in Reasoning , 2006, Psychological science.

[20]  A. Tversky,et al.  Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk — Source link , 2007 .

[21]  Sandy Lovie How the mind works , 1980, Nature.

[22]  Eliot R. Smith,et al.  Dual-Process Models in Social and Cognitive Psychology: Conceptual Integration and Links to Underlying Memory Systems , 2000 .

[23]  Jonathan Evans Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition. , 2008, Annual review of psychology.

[24]  S. Alexander Haslam,et al.  I Think, Therefore I Err? , 2007 .

[25]  S Epstein,et al.  The relation of rational and experiential information processing styles to personality, basic beliefs, and the ratio-bias phenomenon. , 1999, Journal of personality and social psychology.

[26]  H. Barrett,et al.  Modularity in cognition: framing the debate. , 2006, Psychological review.

[27]  A. Kruglanski,et al.  TOwaRd a RElaTiviTy ThEORy Of RaTiONaliTy , 2009 .

[28]  Roger C. Schank,et al.  Scripts, plans, goals and understanding: an inquiry into human knowledge structures , 1978 .

[29]  Jonathan Evans Thinking Twice: Two minds in one brain , 2010 .

[30]  E. Thompson,et al.  The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness , 2007 .

[31]  N. McGlynn Thinking fast and slow. , 2014, Australian veterinary journal.

[32]  S. Gould Bully for Brontosaurus , 1991 .

[33]  K. Stanovich Rationality and the Reflective Mind , 2010 .

[34]  Marvin Minsky,et al.  A framework for representing knowledge , 1974 .

[35]  Gerd Gigerenzer,et al.  Surrogates for Theory , 2009 .

[36]  J. Fodor The Modularity of mind. An essay on faculty psychology , 1986 .

[37]  Peter Carruthers,et al.  On Fodor's Problem , 2003 .

[38]  A. Tversky,et al.  Judgments of and by Representativeness , 1981 .

[39]  G. Gigerenzer,et al.  Intuitive and Deliberate Judgments Are Based on Common Principles This Article Has Been Corrected. See Last Page , 2022 .

[40]  Donald E. Campbell,et al.  Realization of Choice Functions , 1978 .

[41]  L. Cosmides,et al.  Mapping the mind: Origins of domain specificity: The evolution of functional organization , 1994 .

[42]  Max Coltheart,et al.  Modularity and cognition , 1999, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

[43]  Massimo Marraffa The Mind Doesn't Work That Way. The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology , 2001 .

[44]  Seymour Epstein,et al.  Some basic issues regarding dual-process theories from the perspective of cognitive–experiential self-theory. , 1999 .

[45]  Jonathan Evans On the resolution of conflict in dual process theories of reasoning , 2007 .

[46]  Arie W Kruglanski,et al.  Only One? The Default Interventionist Perspective as a Unimodel—Commentary on Evans & Stanovich (2013) , 2013, Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the Association for Psychological Science.

[47]  Shlomo Zilberstein,et al.  Models of Bounded Rationality , 1995 .

[48]  H. Erb,et al.  Searching for commonalities in human judgement: The parametric unimodel and its dual mode alternatives , 2003 .

[49]  P. Todd,et al.  Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart , 1999 .

[50]  A. Schoenfeld On mathematics as sense-making: An informal attack on the unfortunate divorce of formal and informal mathematics. , 1991 .

[51]  R. Selten,et al.  Bounded rationality: The adaptive toolbox , 2000 .

[52]  Lorraine Daston,et al.  Scientific Error and the Ethos of Belief , 2014 .

[53]  Jonathan Evans,et al.  Science Perspectives on Psychological , 2022 .

[54]  A. Kruglanski,et al.  TARGET ARTICLE: On Parametric Continuities in the World of Binary Either Ors , 2006 .

[55]  A. Hama Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions , 2010 .

[56]  J. Fodor The Modularity of mind. An essay on faculty psychology , 1986 .

[57]  K. Stanovich,et al.  The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks , 2011, Memory & cognition.

[58]  A. Tversky,et al.  Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment , 1983 .

[59]  S. Kouider,et al.  Cognitive Theories of Consciousness , 2009 .

[60]  Peter Carruthers,et al.  The Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought , 2006 .

[61]  Kevin W. Eva,et al.  The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance: Expertise in Medicine and Surgery , 2006 .

[62]  Gary Klein,et al.  Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions , 2017 .

[63]  S. Sloman Two systems of reasoning. , 2002 .

[64]  D. Sperber,et al.  Intuitive and Reflective Inferences , 2008 .

[65]  S. Dehaene,et al.  The Number Sense: How the Mind Creates Mathematics. , 1998 .

[66]  R. Nisbett,et al.  Culture, dialectics, and reasoning about contradiction. , 1999 .

[67]  R. Kurzban,et al.  Why Everyone (Else) Is a Hypocrite: Evolution and the Modular Mind , 2011 .