论文信息 - All equilibria of the Vickrey auction - 字舞流文

All equilibria of the Vickrey auction

Abstract This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in the second-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders. In addition, we show that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness.

Andreas Blume | Paul Heidhues

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