Truthful Computing in Wireless Networks

In this Chapter, we assume that all wireless nodes are possibly owned by individual users and the users are able to modify the algorithms deployed on them for the sake of their own interests. We also assume that each wireless node has a cost to forward the data for other nodes and a node will only relay the data if it got a payment to cover its relay cost. We studied how the source node can design a payment scheme to all relay nodes such that the relay nodes have to report its cost truthfully to maximize their profits both for the case of unicast and the case of multicast. We also discussed the selfishness of wireless nodes in other layers including MAC layer, TCP/IP layer, and application layer.

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