Learning and Evolution in Games: An Overview

The theory of learning and evolution in games provides models of disequilibrium behaviour in strategic settings. Much of the theory focuses on whether and when disequilibrium behaviour will resolve in equilibrium play, and, if it does, on predicting which equilibrium will be played. But the theory also offers techniques for characterizing perpetual disequilibrium play.

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