Optimal and near-optimal mechanism design with interdependent values

We study optimal and approximately-optimal mechanism design questions in the interdependent values model, which generalizes the standard setting of independent and private values. We focus our attention on ex post incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms, and develop an analog of Myerson's optimal auction theory that applies to many interdependent settings of interest. We demonstrate two applications for specific interdependent settings: First, a parallel result to the well-known optimality of the second-price auction with reserve for i.i.d.~bidders, where the English auction replaces the second-price one. Second, we identify good prior-independent auctions --- auctions with near-optimal expected revenue across a wide range of priors --- for certain interdependent value settings.

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