Compensation preferences of R&D-suppliers: some empirical results

R&D suppliers who are not compensated according to their preferences are motivated to behave opportunistically. The paper presents empirical findings about these preferences. The investigation is based on the assumption that the probability of a continuous compensation, instead of a final payment, increases when the negotiation power of the supplier rises. The results confirm this presumption with regard to the power determinants of effective intellectual property rights and the number of cooperation alternatives. In contrast to that, suppliers, who control the complementary assets themselves, have no explicit preference.

[1]  W. Dugger.  The Economic Institutions of Capitalism , 1987 .

[2]  Kai-Ingo Voigt,et al.  Innovationskooperationen im Zeitwettbewerb , 1999 .

[3]  S. Masten.  The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry , 1984, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[4]  Leon A.G. Oerlemans,et al.  R&D Cooperation in a Transaction Cost Perspective , 2001 .

[5]  T. Teichert,et al.  Erfolgspotential internationaler F&E-Kooperationen , 1994 .

[6]  K. Leffler,et al.  Transactions Costs and the Efficient Organization of Production: A Study of Timber-Harvesting Contracts , 1991, Journal of Political Economy.

[7]  C. Debresson,et al.  Networks of innovators:A review and introduction to the issue , 1991 .

[8]  G. John.  An Empirical Investigation of Some Antecedents of Opportunism in a Marketing Channel , 1984 .

[9]  B. Loasby.  The External Control of Organizations. A Resource Dependence Perspective , 1979 .

[10]  F. Dwyer,et al.  Output Sector Munificence Effects on the Internal Political Economy of Marketing Channels , 1987 .

[11]  Dietmar Harhoff,et al.  Die ZEW-Gründungspanels: Konzeptionelle Überlegungen und Analysepotential , 1997 .

[12]  D. Teece.  Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy , 1993 .

[13]  David J. Teece,et al.  Organizational Competencies and the Boundaries of the Firm , 1998 .

[14]  E. Anderson.  Transaction costs as determinants of opportunism in integrated and independent sales forces , 1988 .

[15]  G. Pisano.  The R&D Boundaries of the Firm: An Empirical Analysis , 1990 .

[16]  K. Provan,et al.  Interorganizational Dependence and Control as Predictors of Opportunism in Dealer-Supplier Relations , 1989 .

[17]  Sanford J. Grossman,et al.  The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration , 1986 .

[18]  Kathleen M. Eisenhardt,et al.  Control: Organizational and Economic Approaches , 1985 .

[19]  V. G. Ouchi,et al.  A conceptual framework for the design and organizational control mechanisms , 1979 .

[20]  K. Brockhoff.  Forschung und Entwicklung : Planung und Kontrolle , 1999 .

[21]  Manfred Krafft.  Der Ansatz der logistischen Regression und seine Interpretation , 1996 .

[22]  Thomas P. Lyon,et al.  What Do "Facilitating Practices" Facilitate? An Empirical Investigation of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Natural Gas Contracts , 1994, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[23]  Yongtae Park,et al.  A new method for technology valuation in monetary value: procedure and application , 2004 .

[24]  G. Schreyögg.  Organisation : Grundlagen moderner Organisationsgestaltung : mit Fallstudien , 1998 .

[25]  Richard Leifer,et al.  Radical Innovation: How Mature Companies Can Outsmart Upstarts , 2000 .

[26]  R. Narula,et al.  Innovating through strategic alliances: moving towards international partnerships and contractual agreements , 1999 .

[27]  O. Williamson.  The economic institutions of capitalism , 1985 .

[28]  S. Masten,et al.  Econometrics of Contracts: an Assessment of Developments in the Empirical Literature on Contracting , 2000 .

[29]  Jacqueline Senker,et al.  Organizational Learning in Cooperative Alliances: Some Case Studies in Biotechnology , 1997 .

[30]  A. Picot,et al.  Organisation: eine ökonomische Perspektive , 1998 .

[31]  A. Saxenian.  The origins and dynamics of production networks in Silicon Valley , 1991 .

[32]  Michael Groß.  Forschungs- und Entwicklungsvertrag , 1993 .

[33]  Christoph Beckmann,et al.  F&E-Management , 1996 .

[34]  J. Pfeffer,et al.  The External Control of Organizations. , 1978 .

[35]  J. E. Forrest,et al.  Strategic Alliances between Large and Small Research Intensive Organizations: Experiences in the Biotechnology Industry , 1992 .

[36]  Georg Licht,et al.  Ergebnisse der Innovationserhebung 1996 , 1996 .

[37]  E. Brousseau,et al.  Technology licensing contracts features and diversity , 1998 .

[38]  O. Williamson.  / STRATEGIZING, ECONOMIZING, AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION , 1991 .

[39]  Stephen Roper,et al.  Internal Versus External R&D: A Study of R&D Choice with Sample Selection , 2002 .

[40]  R. Zeckhauser,et al.  Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business , 1990 .

[41]  Scott E. Masten,et al.  The Economics of Contracts: Econometrics of contracts: an assessment of developments in the empirical literature on contracting , 2002 .

[42]  P. Jost,et al.  Die Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie in der Betriebswirtschaftslehre , 2001 .

[43]  V. Chiesa,et al.  The Externalisation of R&D Activities and the Growing Market of Product Development Services , 2004 .

[44]  E. Brousseau,et al.  Payment Schemes in Technology Licensing Agreements: A Transaction Cost Approach , 2008 .

[45]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Economics, Organization and Management , 1992 .

[46]  J. Sydow.  Strategische Netzwerke: Evolution und Organisation , 1992 .

[47]  Curtis R. Taylor.  Delivery-contingent Contracts for Research , 1993 .

[48]  Roland Helm,et al.  Planung und Vermarktung von Innovationen: die Präferenz von Konsumenten für verschiedene Innovationsumfänge unter Berücksichtigung des optimalen Simulationsniveaus und marktbezogener Einflussfaktoren , 2001 .

[49]  S. Masten,et al.  The Costs of Organization , 1991 .

[50]  Kenneth J. Reynolds,et al.  The efficiency of incomplete contracts: an empirical analysis of air force engine procurement , 1993 .

[51]  Keith Hayward,et al.  Technological collaboration in industry: strategy, policy and internationalization in innovation , 1994 .

[52]  J. Pfeffer,et al.  The Power and the Glory@@@Managing with Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations. , 1992 .

[53]  Marvin B. Lieberman,et al.  DETERMINANTS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION: AN EMPIRICAL TEST. , 1991 .

[54]  Georg Berger,et al.  Regionale Verteilung technologieorientierter Unternehmensgründungen , 1995 .

[55]  Henri C. Dekker,et al.  Control of inter-organizational relationships: evidence on appropriation concerns and coordination requirements , 2004 .

[56]  M. Spence.  Job Market Signaling , 1973 .

[57]  Mark Dodgson,et al.  Technological Collaboration in Industry: Strategy, Policy, and Internationalization in Innovation , 1993 .

[58]  Torsten J. Gerpott,et al.  Strategisches Technologie- und Innovationsmanagement , 2005 .

[59]  Mathias Rüdiger.  Marketing-Erfolgsfaktoren für F&E-Dienstleister - Ergebnisse einer empirischen Analyse , 2002 .