Teleological Essentialism: Generalized

Natural/social kind essentialism is the view that natural kind categories, both living and non-living natural kinds, as well as social kinds (e.g., race, gender), are essentialized. On this view, artifactual kinds are not essentialized. Our view-teleological essentialism-is that a broad range of categories are essentialized in terms of teleology, including artifacts. Utilizing the same kinds of experiments typically used to provide evidence of essentialist thinking-involving superficial change (study 1), transformation of insides (study 2), and inferences about offspring (study 3)-we find support for the view that a broad range of categories-living natural kinds, non-living natural kinds, and artifactual kinds-are essentialized in terms of teleology. Study 4 tests a unique prediction of teleological essentialism and also provides evidence that people make inferences about purposes which in turn guide categorization judgments.

[1]  Paul Bloom Intention, history, and artifact concepts , 1996, Cognition.

[2]  K. Reuter,et al.  Dual Character Concepts in Social Cognition: Commitments and the Normative Dimension of Conceptual Representation. , 2017, Cognitive science.

[3]  Treysi Terziyan,et al.  Toddlers view artifact function normatively , 2009 .

[4]  Joshua Rottman,et al.  Journal of Experimental Psychology : General Professional Physical Scientists Display Tenacious Teleological Tendencies : Purpose-Based Reasoning as a Cognitive Default , 2012 .

[5]  Shaun Nichols,et al.  From punishment to universalism , 2018, Mind & Language.

[6]  David Rose,et al.  Folk intuitions of actual causation: a two-pronged debunking explanation , 2017 .

[7]  David Rose,et al.  Persistence through function preservation , 2014, Synthese.

[8]  Paul Bloom,et al.  Religion is natural. , 2007, Developmental science.

[9]  Zachary Estes,et al.  Metamorphosis : Essence , appearance , and behavior in the categorization of natural kinds , 2010 .

[10]  Krista Casler,et al.  Do adults make scale errors too? How function sometimes trumps size. , 2014, Journal of experimental psychology. General.

[11]  David Rose,et al.  Neuroscientific Prediction and the Intrusion of Intuitive Metaphysics , 2017, Cogn. Sci..

[12]  George E. Newman,et al.  The essence of essentialism , 2019, Mind & Language.

[13]  D. Kelemen,et al.  Developmental Continuity in Teleo-Functional Explanation: Reasoning about Nature Among Romanian Romani Adults , 2008 .

[14]  Joshua Knobe,et al.  Normative Judgments and Individual Essence. , 2017, Cognitive science.

[15]  D. Sperber Are folk taxonomies “memes”? , 1998, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[16]  Barbara C. Malt,et al.  Do artifact concepts have cores , 1992 .

[17]  Jonathan Schaffer,et al.  Folk Mereology is Teleological , 2017 .

[18]  D. Iacobucci,et al.  A Meditation on Mediation: Evidence that Structural Equations Models Perform Better than Regressions , 2007 .

[19]  F. Keil Mapping the mind: The birth and nurturance of concepts by domains: The origins of concepts of living things , 1994 .

[20]  Edouard Machery,et al.  Deep trouble for the deep self , 2012 .

[21]  Joshua Knobe,et al.  Dual character concepts and the normative dimension of conceptual representation , 2013, Cognition.

[22]  S. Gelman Artifacts and Essentialism , 2013, Review of Philosophy and Psychology.

[23]  H. Wellman,et al.  Insides and essences: Early understandings of the non-obvious , 1991, Cognition.

[24]  L. Rips Similarity, typicality, and categorization , 1989 .

[25]  Shaun Nichols,et al.  The Lesson of Bypassing , 2013 .

[26]  D. Kelemen,et al.  The Human Function Compunction: Teleological explanation in adults , 2009, Cognition.

[27]  Joshua Knobe,et al.  Beliefs About the True Self Explain Asymmetries Based on Moral Judgment , 2015, Cogn. Sci..

[28]  D. Medin,et al.  Comments on part I: psychological essentialism , 1989 .

[29]  Joshua Knobe,et al.  The True Self: A Psychological Concept Distinct From the Self , 2017, Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the Association for Psychological Science.

[30]  Why are rocks pointy? Children's preference for teleological explanations of the natural world. , 1999 .

[31]  Treysi Terziyan,et al.  Children's scale errors with tools. , 2011, Developmental psychology.