Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Waiting Lists
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] J. Little. A Proof for the Queuing Formula: L = λW , 1961 .
[2] J D Littler,et al. A PROOF OF THE QUEUING FORMULA , 1961 .
[3] P. Naor. The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls , 1969 .
[4] Y. Barzel. A Theory of Rationing by Waiting , 1974, The Journal of Law and Economics.
[5] De Vany,et al. Uncertainty, Waiting Time, and Capacity Utilization: A Stochastic Theory of Product Quality , 1976 .
[6] D. Carlton,et al. Market Behavior with Demand Uncertainty and Price Inflexibility , 1976 .
[7] D. Carlton,et al. Peak-load pricing with stochastic demand , 1977 .
[8] S. Stidham,et al. Individual versus Social Optimization in the Allocation of Customers to Alternative Servers , 1983 .
[9] Edward H. Kaplan,et al. Managing the demand for public housing , 1984 .
[10] C. M. Lindsay,et al. Rationing by waiting lists. , 1984, The American economic review.
[11] P. Cramton,et al. Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently , 1985 .
[12] Edward H. Kaplan,et al. Tenant Assignment Models , 1986, Oper. Res..
[14] Edward H. Kaplan,et al. A PUBLIC HOUSING QUEUE WITH RENEGING , 1988 .
[15] Eitan Altman,et al. Individual Equilibrium and Learning in Processor Sharing Systems , 1998, Oper. Res..
[16] Stefanos A. Zenios,et al. Modeling the transplant waiting list: A queueing model with reneging , 1999, Queueing Syst. Theory Appl..
[17] Stephen Martin,et al. Rationing by waiting lists: an empirical investigation , 1999 .
[18] Lawrence M. Wein,et al. Dynamic Allocation of Kidneys to Candidates on the Transplant Waiting List , 2000, Oper. Res..
[19] Vol Cxv Issue. EFFICIENT AUCTIONS , 2000 .
[20] Refael Hassin,et al. To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems , 2002 .
[21] D. Bergemann,et al. Robust Mechanism Design , 2003 .
[22] R. Wiesner,et al. Model for end-stage liver disease (MELD) and allocation of donor livers. , 2003, Gastroenterology.
[23] David M. Kreps,et al. Relational Incentive Contracts , 2003 .
[24] Jeffrey C. Ely,et al. Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms , 2007 .
[25] Xuanming Su,et al. Patient Choice in Kidney Allocation: The Role of the Queueing Discipline , 2004, Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag..
[26] Xuanming Su,et al. Patient Choice in Kidney Allocation: A Sequential Stochastic Assignment Model , 2005, Oper. Res..
[27] Xuanming Su,et al. Recipient Choice Can Address the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off in Kidney Transplantation: A Mechanism Design Model , 2006, Manag. Sci..
[28] Atila Abdulkadiro,et al. Dynamic House Allocations , 2007 .
[29] Andrew J. Schaefer,et al. Determining the Acceptance of Cadaveric Livers Using an Implicit Model of the Waiting List , 2007, Oper. Res..
[30] M. Utku Ünver,et al. Dynamic Kidney Exchange , 2007 .
[31] G. Jung,et al. Model for end-stage liver disease , 2008, Der Chirurg.
[32] Morimitsu Kurino,et al. House allocation with overlapping agents: A dynamic mechanism design approach , 2009 .
[33] Gideon Weiss,et al. Fcfs infinite bipartite matching of servers and customers , 2009, Advances in Applied Probability.
[34] Alexander Frankel,et al. Aligned Delegation , 2010 .
[35] D. Bergemann,et al. DYNAMIC AUCTIONS , 2010 .
[36] Benny Moldovanu,et al. Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information , 2010, Games Econ. Behav..
[37] Morimitsu Kurino. House allocation with overlapping generations , 2011 .
[38] Daniel Monte,et al. The Daycare Assignment Problem , 2011 .
[39] Gideon Weiss,et al. Exact FCFS Matching Rates for Two Infinite Multitype Sequences , 2012, Oper. Res..
[40] A. Israni,et al. The kidney allocation system. , 2013, The Surgical clinics of North America.
[41] Mohammad Akbarpour,et al. Dynamic matching market design , 2014, EC.
[42] A. Ichino,et al. Time Allocation and Task Juggling , 2014 .
[43] Allan Collard-Wexler,et al. Dynamic Inputs and Resource (Mis)Allocation , 2014, Journal of Political Economy.
[44] Daniel Monte,et al. The Day Care Assignment: A Dynamic Matching Problem , 2014 .
[45] Judd B. Kessler,et al. Getting More Organs for Transplantation. , 2014, The American economic review.
[46] Francis Bloch,et al. Dynamic Allocation of Objects to Queuing Agents: The Discrete Model , 2014 .
[47] Sanmay Das,et al. Competing Dynamic Matching Markets , 2015, AMMA 2015.
[48] Brendan Lucier,et al. Non-Optimal Mechanism Design , 2015 .
[49] Itai Ashlagi,et al. A dynamic model of barter exchange , 2015, SODA.
[50] Gabriel D. Carroll. Robustness and Linear Contracts , 2015 .
[51] Laura Doval. A Theory of Stability in Dynamic Matching Markets , 2015 .
[52] On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets , 2016, EC.
[53] Daniel Fershtman. Matching Auctions: Experimentation and Cross-Subsidization∗ , 2016 .
[54] Benjamin A. Brooks,et al. Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design , 2016 .
[55] Nick Arnosti,et al. Design of Lotteries and Waitlists for Affordable Housing Allocation , 2017 .
[56] Francis Bloch,et al. Dynamic Assignment of Objects to Queuing Agents , 2017 .
[57] W. Dijk,et al. The socio-economic consequences of housing assistance , 2018 .
[58] On the Efficiency of Queueing in Dynamic Matching Markets , 2019 .
[59] Leeat Yariv,et al. Optimal dynamic matching , 2020 .
[60] Daniel Waldinger,et al. Targeting In-Kind Transfers through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation , 2021 .
[61] Carson J. Reeling,et al. Welfare effects of dynamic matching: An empirical analysis , 2021, The Review of Economic Studies.
[62] James Schummer,et al. Influencing waiting lists , 2021, J. Econ. Theory.