论文信息 - Preferences Over Solutions to the Margaining Probem

Preferences Over Solutions to the Margaining Probem

There are several solutions to the Nash bargaining problem in the literature. Since various authors have expressed preferences for one solution over another, we find it useful to study preferences over solutions in their own right. We identify a set of appealing axioms on such preferences that lead to unanimity in the choice of solution, which turns out to be the solution of Nash.

Kim C. Border | Uzi Segal | Uzi Segal

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