论文信息 - Rationality and equilibrium in perfect-information games

Rationality and equilibrium in perfect-information games

In generic perfect-information games the unique Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) outcome is identical to the one predicted by several rationalizability notions, like Extensive-Form Rationalizability (EFR), the Backward Dominance Procedure (BDP), and Extensive-Form Rationalizability of the Agent form (AEFR). We show that, in contrast, within the general class of perfect information games all these solution concepts are genuinely distinct in terms of the outcomes that they predict: SPE is more restrictive than EFR, which is in turn more restrictive than BDP, which is, finally, more restrictive than AEFR.

Aviad Heifetz | Ronen Gradwohl | A. Heifetz | R. Gradwohl

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