The Self-Concept

The self-concept is undergoing something of a renaissance in contemporary social psychology. It has, of course, been a central concept within symbolic interactionism since the seminal writings of Mead ( 1934), Cooley (1902), and James ( 1890). However, even within this sociological tradition there has been a revitalization of interest in the self-concept: with developments in role theory (Turner 1978; Gordon 1976), with the increasing focus on the concept of identity (McCall & Simmons 1978; Stryker 1980; Gordon 1968; Guiot 1977; Burke 1980), with the reemergence of interest in social structure and person­ ality (House 198 1 ; Turner 1976; Kohn 1969, 198 1 ; Rosenberg 1979), and with the reconceptualization of small group experimental situations (Alexander and colleagues 197 1 , 1 98 1 ; Webster & Sobieszek 1974). The reemergence of the self-concept is even more dramatic within psycho­ logical social psychology. Much of this revitalization of interest in self­ phenomena (e.g. self-awareness, self-esteem, self-image, self-evaluation) is due to the "cognitive revolution" in psychology (Dember 1974; Manis 1977), generally at the expense of behaviorism. As a result, the self-concept has become conspicuous in areas and traditions that were previously considered alien terrain: within behaviorism via Bern's ( 1972) theory of self-attribution; within social learning theory via Bandura's ( 1977) focus on self-efficacy; and within cognitive dissonance theory via Aronson's ( 1968) and Bramel's ( 1968) reformulations. It is also increasingly evident in theories of attitude and value formation and change (Rokeach 1973, 1979), in attribution theory (Epstein. 1973; Bowerman 1978), and in various other recent theories of cognitive