Network Prominence, Bargaining Power, and the Allocation of Value Capturing Rights in High-Tech Alliance Contracts

We suggest and provide empirical evidence that the bargaining power of alliance partners stemming from their prominence in alliance networks influences the ex-ante allocation of value capturing rights in high-tech alliance contracts. Network prominence can enhance the availability of alternative partners for a firm and thereby elevates the firm’s bargaining power and enables the firm to receive (i) more value capturing rights vis-a-vis its partner (i.e., more net value capturing rights) and (ii) more rights to the unexpected outcomes vis-a-vis its partner. We empirically investigate the content of research and development (R&D) collaboration contracts between biotech and pharmaceutical firms and show that as the prominence of the client (i.e., pharmaceutical firm) increases, it is able to attain (i) more net value capturing rights to outcomes within the area of collaboration and (ii) more rights to unexpected outcomes. By contrast, increased prominence of the R&D firm (i.e., biotech firm) decreases both t...

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