A Malice-Antagonized Interaction Mechanism for Fair Interaction

With outstanding advantages in constructing distributed system, the research and the application on the mobile agents become more and more attractive. However, at the same time, security problem always is a key obstacle for further extending the application of mobile agent, especially the security problem on mobile agent self-protecting. This paper tries to make an exploration in this field with the focus on the malicious behaviors in the mobile agent interaction. Because of the malice of interact counterpart and the limitation of detection mechanism, the normal or legal agent will have the loss in the interaction. Based on the activities in the physical society, normal agent being malicious will make the interaction become fair. Therefore, this paper presents our Malice-Antagonized Interaction Mechanism(MAIM)that allows agents to become. In order to analyze the viability of MAIM in the computable space, we apply game theory and by that we make a series of analysis on that mechanism in several typical types of game, i.e. pure strategy game with perfect information, mixed strategy game with perfect information, sequential strategy game with non-perfect information, and simultaneous strategy game. And after that, we get the conclusions that in the pure strategy game, it is impossible to get the fair interaction under our MAIM model, however in other MAIM models, it is viable.