A hyperintensional logical framework for deontic reasons

In this paper we argue that normative reasons are hyperintensional and put forward a formal account of this thesis. That reasons are hyperintensional means that a reason for a proposition does not imply that it is also a reason for a logically equivalent proposition. In the first part we consider three arguments for the hyperintensionality of reasons: (i) an argument from the nature of reasons, (ii) an argument from substitutivity and (iii) an argument from explanatory power. In the second part we describe a hyperintensional logic of reasons based on justification logics. Eventually we discuss the philosophical import of this proposal and highlight some limitations and possible developments.

[1]  Christian List,et al.  What Matters and How it Matters: A Choice-Theoretic Representation of Moral Theories , 2016 .

[2]  Eugenio Orlandelli,et al.  Proof Analysis in Deontic Logics , 2014, DEON.

[3]  Sergei N. Artëmov.  THE LOGIC OF JUSTIFICATION , 2008, The Review of Symbolic Logic.

[4]  Sergei N. Artëmov.  The Ontology of Justifications in the Logical Setting , 2012, Stud Logica.

[5]  Kit Fine.  Permission and Possible Worlds , 2014 .

[6]  L. Goble.  The iteration of deontic modalities , 1966 .

[7]  Ruth Barcan Marcus.  ITERATED DEONTIC MODALITIES , 1966 .

[8]  Timothy Williamson,et al.  Modal Logic as Metaphysics , 2013 .

[9]  Natalia Rubtsova.  Evidence Reconstruction of Epistemic Modal Logic S5 , 2006, CSR.

[10]  Benjamin Schnieder,et al.  Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality , 2012 .

[11]  J. Broome.  Reason versus ought , 2015 .

[12]  Jörgen Jörgensen,et al.  Imperatives and logic , 1937, Erkenntnis.

[13]  Benjamin Schnieder,et al.  A LOGIC FOR ‘BECAUSE’ , 2011, The Review of Symbolic Logic.

[14]  Christian List,et al.  A reason-based theory of rational choice , 2013 .

[15]  John Broome,et al.  Rationality Through Reasoning , 2013 .

[16]  Melvin Fitting,et al.  The logic of proofs, semantically , 2005, Ann. Pure Appl. Log..

[18]  M. Jago.  The Impossible: An Essay on Hyperintensionality , 2014 .

[19]  Daniel N. Osherson,et al.  PREFERENCE BASED ON REASONS , 2011, The Review of Symbolic Logic.

[20]  J. Horty.  Reasons as Defaults , 2012 .

[21]  Sergei N. Artëmov.  Explicit provability and constructive semantics , 2001, Bull. Symb. Log..