Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation.
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Drew Fudenberg | Christine Taylor | Martin A Nowak | D. Fudenberg | M. Nowak | L. Imhof | Christine Taylor | Lorens A Imhof
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