The imperviance of conceptual systems: cognitive and moral aspects

Purpose The complexity of the modern world calls for the increasingly complex (i.e. containing more concepts) and systemic (i.e. containing more causal connections between the concepts) conceptual systems, such as theories and mental models which may exist at varying levels of complexity and systemicity. Yet, these systems are often found to be impervious to data and counter-arguments. Examples of such disputes are found in arguments over global warming and in the many debates between political groups. The purpose of this paper is to review the reasons behind this imperviance and identify ways to move forward. Design/methodology/approach The paper brings together the insights from the burgeoning science of conceptual systems as well as selected ideas from the moral philosophies of Niklas Luhmann and Jurgen Habermas. The science of conceptual systems is utilized to unearth the cognitive reasons for the imperviance of conceptual systems, while the work of Luhmann and Habermas is brought to bear on the moral reasons. Findings The most salient cognitive reasons for this imperviance are shown to be related to the questionable validity of data, the situational inappropriateness of conceptual systems, as well as their low complexity and systemicity. The effect of the moral content of conceptual systems on their imperviance is ambivalent. For Luhmann, moral communication may enhance imperviance and induce conflicts. In contrast, the Habermasian discourse ethics may counteract imperviance by stimulating the rational moral argumentation. Originality/value The science of conceptual systems is uniquely positioned to analyze the pervasive problem of their imperviance, especially if this problem is aggravated by moral reasons.